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INTRODUCTION 
A smartphone can contain hundreds of patents on everything from touch 
screen technology, to cameras, to GPS mapping, and just as the saying goes, 
“There’s an app for that.” There’s also a patent for that, and worse, we are 
finding that there is a patent troll for that, too.1 
Patent law is facing growing pains as it tries to operate within a framework 
originally created with different technology in mind. As technological 
advancements have proliferated in recent decades, cracks in the patent system’s 
foundation have become apparent. As Justice Breyer pointed out, “[t]oday’s 
patent world is not a steam-engine world. We have decided to patent tens of 
thousands of software products and similar things where hardly anyone knows 
what the patent’s really about.”2 There is a mounting concern among scholars 
and members of Congress that the patent system is infested with invalid 
patents.3 While a precise number of invalid patents currently in force is not 
measurable,4 studies suggest that the over-granting of patents is a real threat.5 
Invalid patents increase transaction costs for subsequent innovators: 
innovators must navigate unnecessary red tape and non-practicing entities 
(commonly referred to as “patent trolls”) can abuse the patent system by 
threatening to assert these invalid patents against others. 
The patent system can combat the problem of invalid patents at three stages. 
First, more resources can be dedicated to the United States Patent and Trademark 
 
1 Examining Recent Supreme Court Cases in the Patent Arena: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa). 
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 
14-1513). 
3 See generally 157 CONG. REC. H4420, H4425 (2011); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. 
Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a 
Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent 
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181 (2008). 
4 For a patent to be deemed invalid, a party must bring a lawsuit and succeed in overcoming 
the presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). Thus, absent a challenge to every patent, 
the number of invalid patents cannot be verified, or even easily estimated. Further, due to the secrecy 
of patent applications, statistics regarding the over-granting of patents are unobtainable because 
there is incomplete data regarding the percent of patent applications issued. See Lemley & Sampat, 
supra note 3, at 182 (“The result has been significant controversy over the underlying question of 
what percentage of applications actually issue as patents.”). 
5 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 3, at 648 (claiming that the PTO is over-granting patents to 
meet deadlines in the face of substantial backlog). The PTO relieves its burden by granting, rather than 
rejecting, patent applications because a PTO rejection is not final. See id. at 625 (describing measures an 
applicant can take after rejection); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2190 (9th ed., rev. Nov. 2015) (explaining that while the doctrine of 
prosecution laches may limit the number of continuation applications an applicant may file, the doctrine 
applies “only in egregious cases of unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution” and lacks any 
“firm guidelines”). 
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Office (PTO). The initial review of patent applications can be expanded to allow 
for a more thorough vetting upon initial receipt. Possible measures of reform could 
include hiring more examiners, increasing the time spent on each patent 
application, or requiring greater disclosure of prior art by the potential patentee. 
But reform at this stage would provide an incomplete solution because it would 
fail to dispose of bad patents that are already in circulation. 
A second point at which invalid patents can be confronted is the post-issuance, 
pre-litigation stage. This approach was followed in the 2011 America Invents Act 
(AIA).6 With a concern for invalid patents at the forefront of policy discussions,7 
the AIA bolstered administrative proceedings at this intermediate stage, 
introducing inter partes review and post-grant review.8 Congress sought to create 
an “administrative route more efficient and less expensive than district court 
litigation.”9 Still, invalid patents have continued to plague the patent system in 
the years following the implementation of the AIA.10 Setting aside the 
questionable effectiveness of these administrative routes, there is a more 
immediate question of whether these proceedings by the PTO are even 
constitutional. The Supreme Court will address this issue in its coming term.11 
The final stage at which invalid patents can be eliminated is litigation. 
When optimally structured, litigation is a promising method of correcting 
errors carried over from the patent issuance stage. An adversarial system 
provides an opportunity for a judge to have a (potentially) fair view of both 
parties’ positions. The finality of the decision provides clarity for patent owners 
and the public. But the current litigation system suffers from procedural 
defects, making it costly, time consuming, and ill-equipped to handle an 
abundance of patents. Patent litigation costs in the United States are extremely 
high, especially as compared to foreign patent systems.12 In addition to the high 
costs, parties are tied up for an average of two and a half years before their cases 
 
6 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012) (describing inter partes and 
post-grant review proceedings). 
7 See 157 CONG. REC. H4420, H4425. 
8 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321. 
9 Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in 
Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 126 (2012). 
10 See Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa) (noting that in 2015, 
frivolous lawsuits brought by patent trolls are still a concern); see also Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the 
End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2014) (discussing the inability for post-
grant review and inter partes review to capture enough claims). 
11 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 Fed. Appx. 639 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3578 (U.S. June 12, 2017) (No. 16-712). 
12 See GEOGRAPHY, LOCATION, AND STRATEGY, 31 (Juan Alcácer et al. eds., 2017) 
(commenting that patent litigation costs in the United States range from one to ten million dollars 
on average, coming in at ten to twenty times higher than costs in Europe). 
1032 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1029 
reach trial.13 With these substantial burdens, patent litigation is not a realistic 
option for small companies, nor is the system well-equipped to sort through a 
large volume of patent disputes. Thus, patent litigation is a good candidate 
for reform. A more streamlined system will allow increased access to 
litigation, thereby increasing the number of patents that courts can either 
dispose of or validate. 
This Comment proposes to improve three procedural aspects of patent 
litigation: the standard for granting enhanced damages, pleading requirements, 
and venue rules. The rules and jurisprudence currently controlling these 
elements of patent litigation favor large, wealthy companies, exacerbate the 
abuse of the system by patent trolls, and ultimately create inefficiencies. 
Recently, the Court in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. addressed 
one of these procedural aspects.14 The Court rejected the established 
framework for enhanced damages and implemented a new standard. Part I of 
this Comment addresses the evolution of enhanced damages jurisprudence 
leading up to Halo, and Part II addresses the changes in patent law that the 
case brought about. I argue in Part III that these changes in the law will fail 
to serve the goals of the patent system discussed above—namely, 
implementing a cost-effective, efficient system better equipped to weed out 
bad patents. Indeed, I argue that Halo will likely make invalid patents even 
harder to eliminate than they were before. 
In Part IV, I propose an alternate solution, which seeks to streamline the 
litigation process by altering the standards of the three procedural aspects of 
patent litigation discussed above. The solution reigns in the discretion that Halo 
grants district courts in the enhanced damages analysis. Further, it heightens the 
pleading standard and calls for stricter venue rules. By optimizing these 
procedural aspects, I propose a litigation structure that allows resources to be 
allocated to determining the validity and scope of patents, rather than 
squandered in drawn-out litigation fights or settlements of nuisance suits. 
I. LEGAL BACKDROP FOR ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW 
The standard by which enhanced damages are awarded is one variable 
among many that legislators and policymakers can adjust to optimize the 
patent litigation system. To better appreciate the significance of the current 
jurisprudence, it is helpful to recognize the features that have been 
incorporated into the enhanced damages analysis (and those that have been 
 
13 CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/
forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U9H-9JN2]. 
14 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
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abandoned) over time, and compare the evolution of analogous doctrines—
here, the award of attorney’s fees.  
A. History of Enhanced Damages 
The first United States patent laws heavily favored patent holders’ rights 
by making treble damages mandatory in cases of patent infringement.15 
Subsequent legislation has moved away from this approach: enhanced 
damages are no longer automatic. Since the establishment of discretionary 
enhanced damages for patent infringement in 1836,16 case law has shaped the 
bounds of this discretion. 
Courts have been the primary actors in determining what infringing acts 
warrant enhanced damages. 
One rule established an affirmative duty to exercise due care,17 subjecting 
defendants who did not affirmatively search for patents or obtain opinion of 
counsel to the possibility of treble damages. This approach was later 
abandoned on the justification that an affirmative duty to exercise due care 
was needlessly demanding for the new innovator.18 In Read Corp. v. Portec, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit adopted a nine-factor test to assist district courts in 
determining whether to grant enhanced damages in patent infringement 
 
15 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 §5 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952)) (“That 
if any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing so invented, the exclusive right of which shall 
. . . have been secured to any person by patent, without the consent of the patentee . . . shall forfeit and 
pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price . . . .”); see also Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 37:23-38:1, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 14-
1513) (“[H]istorically enhanced damages were automatic, and they were automatic because of a policy 
judgment that owning a patent entitled you to not have people infringe willfully or not willfully.”). 
16 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 §14 (1836) (“[W]henever . . . a verdict shall be rendered 
for the plaintiff in such action, it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above 
the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three 
times the amount thereof, according to the circumstances of the case . . . .”). The choice to make enhanced 
damages discretionary was reaffirmed by Congress in the Patent Act of 1952. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952) 
(“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”). 
17 See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an 
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an 
affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel 
. . . .”) (citations omitted). For further background on the policy considerations underlying the 
affirmative duty, see REPORT OF THE INDUS. SUBCOMM. FOR PATENT AND INFO. POLICY OF 
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION 148 (1979) (expressing a desire to foster 
innovation in the United States by strengthening patent rights and “increas[ing] the assurance that 
a patent is a valuable piece of property”). 
18 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he imposition of the due 
care requirement has produced nothing of benefit to the patent system . . . . [W]here such 
reprehensible conduct is absent, it is unnecessary to stretch the law of punitive damages to product 
the patentee because the patentee can secure a preliminary injunction . . . .”). 
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suits.19 Although the Read factors were not an exclusive set of 
considerations,20 the enumeration of factors gave structure to the analysis. 
This framework served as guidance to both the district courts in their original 
decisions and to the Federal Circuit in its review of those decisions. 
The totality of the circumstances approach espoused by Read and 
subsequent cases faced criticism for setting the threshold for enhanced damages 
too low. The Federal Circuit viewed the approach as coming too close to a 
negligence standard and exposing too many potential defendants to enhanced 
damages.21 Consequently, in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the Federal Circuit 
adjusted the standard by adopting a more rigid test which provided that: 
[A] patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement 
of a valid patent . . . . If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee 
must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the 
record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.22 
By requiring a showing of an objectively high likelihood of infringement, 
this test elevated the threshold for enhanced damages. The Seagate test also 
allowed defenses raised at the time of litigation—not merely at the time of 
infringement—to factor into the determination, further increasing the 
difficulty for plaintiffs to recover enhanced damages against alleged 
infringers.23 An undesirable consequence of Seagate’s strict test was that it 
allowed patent owners who were not objectively reckless, but nonetheless 
malicious, to escape liability.24 
 
19 See 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (listing the relevant considerations, including whether the 
infringer deliberately copied, whether the infringer investigated the patent, the infringer’s litigation 
behavior, the infringer’s size and financial state, the closeness of the case, the length of the infringer’s 
misconduct, whether any remedial action was undertaken by the infringer, the motivation of the 
infringer, and whether the infringer made attempts to conceal the misconduct). 
20 See id. (describing the factors as “other circumstances which courts appropriately have 
considered, particularly in deciding on the extent of enhancement”). 
21 See 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (comparing the prior duty to one “that is more akin 
to negligence” and faulting this standard for “fail[ing] to comport with the general understanding 
of willfulness in the civil context”). 
22 Id. 
23 One contentious aspect of the Seagate test was its acceptance of litigation-inspired defenses 
to shield a defendant from enhanced damages. See id. (framing the willfulness question in terms of 
an objectively high likelihood of infringement, such that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer 
is not relevant”); see also WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Kohler 
does not dispute that its obviousness defense was created during litigation . . . . Instead, Kohler 
argues that it is no answer to characterize its obviousness defense as litigation-contrived because 
Seagate’s objective recklessness prong requires analysis of all of the infringer’s . . . defenses, even if 
those defenses were developed for litigation.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016): 
2018] Halo Is Not the Saving Grace 1035 
B. Jurisprudence of Attorney’s Fees 
While the enhanced damages jurisprudence was fluctuating as courts 
attempted to craft an optimal standard, case law surrounding attorney’s fees 
was likewise in flux. Similar to the rigid test presented in Seagate, the 
precedent for attorney’s fees in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. 
Dutailier International, Inc. included a test requiring a showing of both 
subjective bad faith and objective baselessness by clear and convincing 
evidence.25 In Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., the Court 
abandoned this test in favor of a discretionary standard.26 The Court shifted 
the power to district courts to determine “whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in 
the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the 
circumstances.”27 Since the implementation of this discretionary standard, 
the occurrence of attorney’s fees awards has increased.28 
Although parallels can be drawn between Brooks Furniture and Seagate—
and, as will become apparent, between Halo and Octane Fitness29—attorney’s 
fees and enhanced damages present different policy considerations.30 
Lowering the threshold for attorney’s fees can work in favor of either party,31 
 
Such a threshold requirement [of objective recklessness] excludes from discretionary 
punishment many of the most culpable offenders, such as the ‘wanton and malicious 
pirate’ who intentionally infringes another’s patent—with no doubts about its validity 
or any notion of a defense—for no purpose other than to steal the patentee’s business 
. . . . In the context of such deliberate wrongdoing, however, it is not clear why an 
independent showing of objective recklessness—by clear and convincing evidence, no 
less—should be a prerequisite to enhanced damages. 
25 See 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a case is exceptional if “(1) the litigation 
is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless”); see also id. at 1382 
(“[T]he underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the case as exceptional must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
26 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture 
is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”). 
27 Id. at 1756. 
28 CHRIS BARRY ET AL., supra note 13 at 7 (finding that the percentage of cases in which 
attorney’s fees have been awarded increased after the Octane Fitness decision). 
29 See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
30 See Tyler A. Hicks, Comment, Breaking the “Link” Between Awards for Attorney’s Fees and 
Enhanced Damages in Patent Law, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 191, 212-13 (2016) (arguing that Sections 284 
and 285 have different policy implications and thus should be treated differently). 
31 See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 15, 25 (2014) (finding, in a study spanning 2003-2013, that “71% of attorney fee awards 
go to plaintiffs and about 29% to defendants,” but that “the magnitudes of fee awards more clearly 
favor defendants”). Note, however, that a general trend of lowering litigation costs will dampen 
patent troll activity, despite the fact that the attorney fees are not categorically contained to one side 
of litigation. See, e.g., W. Keith Robinson, Awarding Attorney Fees and Deterring ‘Patent Trolls’, 20 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281, 290 (2016) (“[S]ome interpreted [Octane Fitness] as the Court’s way 
of weighing in on the patent troll debate . . . . Indeed, there is also some empirical evidence 
suggesting a decline in lawsuits by patent trolls occurred after Octane Fitness and Highmark.”); Prachi 
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while lowering the threshold for enhanced damages only stands to benefit the 
plaintiff.32 Consequently, a more generous enhanced damages standard 
contributes to the bargaining power differential between parties, skewing 
litigation incentives in favor of plaintiffs. 
II. THE HALO DECISION 
The Court introduced turbulence into the enhanced damages 
jurisprudence via its Halo decision by discarding the two-pronged Seagate 
test.33 Halo also rejected the requirement of clear and convincing proof to 
establish recklessness and abandoned the tripartite standard of review.34 In 
place of these provisions, the Court reintroduced a subjective, fact-intensive 
inquiry, established a preponderance of the evidence standard for recklessness, 
and required an abuse of discretion standard of review.35 Under the new 
analysis, district courts are tasked with “tak[ing] into account the particular 
circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and in what 
amount.”36 District courts must “limit[] the award of enhanced damages to 
egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement”37 and identify 
instances in which conduct is “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, 
consciously wrongful, flagrant, or–indeed–characteristic of a pirate.”38 
Although the Halo Court explicitly drew parallels to Octane Fitness,39 it was 
also loyal to the broader trends apparent in other recent patent decisions. The 
Court has repeatedly adopted fact-intensive analyses over rigid tests, as is 
evidenced by recent jurisprudence in the areas of claim construction,40 
 
Agarwal, Patent Troll: The Brewing Storm of Patent Reform in the United States of America, 15 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 71 (2015) (“Although neither [Octane Fitness nor Highmark] 
pertained to patent trolls, by broadening the scope of discretion for fee-shifting, a patent owner who 
brings a lawsuit without merit is unlikely to get off the hook and . . . the ‘fee shifting’ provision is 
likely to discourage patent trolling by making it less lucrative.”); Aria Soroudi, Comment, Defeating 
Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmark on Patent Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 343-44 
(2014) (advancing the proposition that Highmark and Octane Fitness weaken the threat of patent trolls 
by introducing the potential for less costly litigation for the defendant). 
32 See Hicks, supra note 30, at 212-13 (“If an award of attorney’s fees under Section 285 is a 
double-edged sword, an enhanced damages award under Section 284 is a single-bladed guillotine 
available for use only by patentees who prove the infringer acted ‘willfully.’”). 
33 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016). 
34 Id. at 1934. 
35 Id. at 1933-34. 
36 Id. at 1933. 
37 Id. at 1935. 
38 Id. at 1932. Also note that, under this standard, there is no longer room for litigation-inspired 
defenses to save a patent defendant. Instead, culpability will be measured at the time of infringement, 
not at the time of litigation. See id. at 1933 (analyzing the defendant’s culpability “at the time he acted”). 
39 See id. at 1929, 1932, 1934 (citing Octane Fitness ten times throughout the opinion). 
40 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (holding that the Federal 
Circuit must give deference to evidentiary findings by the trial courts for claim construction matters). 
2018] Halo Is Not the Saving Grace 1037 
patentable subject matter,41 obviousness,42 and permanent injunctions.43 The 
Court has also expressed its inclination to redistribute power from the Federal 
Circuit to the district courts,44 and to bring patent law in line with other areas 
of civil law.45 
The features of the Halo decision track these trends. The Court replaced 
a rigid test with an instruction for district courts to award enhanced damages 
on a case-by-case basis.46 Under the Halo framework, conspicuously absent 
are guidelines for the district courts to follow.47 This eschewal of a formal test 
aligns with the Court’s recent jurisprudence. Next, Halo shifts power and 
discretion to the district courts. Without explicit directives, the Federal 
Circuit will have difficulty overturning the judgment of the lower courts, as 
there will be no clear test to find the district court to have violated. 
Furthermore, the heightened abuse of discretion standard of review will make 
it more difficult for the Federal Circuit to reverse a district court’s enhanced 
damages award. Lastly, Halo embodies a reconciliation of the standard for 
enhanced damages in patent law to that of other areas of civil law.48 
 
41 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-transformation test 
as the sole test for patentability and rejecting a categorical rule of excluding all business methods 
from protection). 
42 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (rejecting the teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation test as the sole test for determining obviousness because the Federal 
Circuit applied it too rigidly, and instead proposing a more subjective standard). 
43 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (criticizing the lower courts 
for using categorical rules to decide whether to grant a permanent injunction). 
44 See Zachary H. Valentine, A Novel, Nonobvious Approach to Curb Abusive Patent Litigants, 21 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 118, 140 (2016) (recognizing that the effect of recent Supreme Court 
decisions, including Octane Fitness and Teva, was to grant more power and discretion to district courts). 
45 See, e.g., eBay, 547 U.S. at 390 (holding that permanent injunctions should be granted in accordance 
with traditional principles of equity); see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (reconciling the attorney’s fees analysis with other areas of civil law by rejecting the 
clear and convincing evidence standard and instead following a preponderance of the evidence standard). 
46 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016). 
47 See, e.g., Simplivity Corp. v. Springpath, Inc., No. 4:15-13345-TSH, 2016 WL 5388951, at *18 
(D. Mass. July 15, 2016) (noting that “apart from its emphatic abrogation of Seagate’s willfulness test, 
Halo itself offered little by way of a concrete standard to assume the mantle”). 
48 In other areas of civil law, enhanced damages are premised on the finding of some variation 
of willfulness and are controlled by a discretionary standard. See, e.g., Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver 
Cty., No. 1141, 2008 WL 11010686 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 15, 2008) (“[T]reble damages under the 
[Consumer Protection Law] should be supported by the presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful 
conduct, and should be in furtherance of the remedial purposes of the statute.”); Hodges v. S.C. 
Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that enhanced damages may be awarded for 
the retaliatory discharge of an employee if “a defendant has acted either (1) intentionally, (2) 
fraudulently, (3) maliciously, or (4) recklessly”). 
1038 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1029 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF HALO 
The features of Halo will favor plaintiffs over defendants and large, robust 
companies over small start-ups. Unlike Octane Fitness, which changed the 
standard for attorney’s fees in a manner that afforded plaintiffs and 
defendants symmetrical protection,49 Halo will only benefit plaintiffs, since 
only plaintiffs benefit from increased availability of enhanced damages. 
Moreover, the increased litigation costs, discussed below, will advantage 
wealthy companies, which are less vulnerable to threats of costly legal battles 
than are smaller companies. 
A. Litigation Costs During Trial Will Rise 
Under Halo, parties litigating the issue of willful infringement will be 
required to expend vast resources due to the ambiguity and fact-specific 
nature of the test. The ambiguous standard will make judgments harder to 
predict and settlements harder to reach, resulting in more drawn-out 
litigation. The fact-intensive inquiry will inflate discovery costs, leading to 
unnecessary acquiescence by potential defendants. 
The vague language used in Halo has led to confusion and has cultivated 
incompatible definitions across district courts. In the wake of Halo, one court 
expressed its confusion by pointing out, “Halo—somewhat confoundingly—
ennobles courts ‘to punish the full range of culpable behavior,’ while also 
‘limiting the award of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct 
beyond typical infringement.’”50 Left without clear directions, some district 
courts have come to inconsistent conceptions of two significant terms used in 
Halo: “willfulness” and “egregiousness.” For example, one district court 
mentioned that infringement could be willful without rising to the level of 
egregiousness,51 while another district court implied that infringement cannot 
be willful unless it is egregious.52 With very little guidance for district courts, 
Halo sets the stage for inconsistency. 
 
49 See Hicks, supra note 30, at 212 (“[Attorney’s fees] under Section 285 are granted to a party 
who proves the opposing party acted in bad faith, regardless of whether the party is the patentee or 
the accused infringer.”). 
50 Simplivity, 2016 WL 5388951, at *18. 
51 See Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 258 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(“Assuming without deciding that the jury’s verdict . . . is sufficient to find subjective willfulness, 
the Court still finds, in its discretion, that the defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level of 
egregiousness meriting an award of enhanced damages.”). 
52 See C.G. Tech. Dev. LLC v. Big Fish Games Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00857-RCJ-VCF, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 115594, at *43-44 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for willful 
infringement because they fail to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant’s conduct is ‘egregious 
. . . beyond typical infringement.’”). Although both courts are performing similar analyses—
enhancing damages upon a finding of egregiousness—the differing conceptual perspectives highlight 
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The confusion among district courts makes their subsequent damage 
analyses in patent infringement suits harder for disputing parties to predict. 
In an unsettled legal landscape, parties will spend more time litigating.53 The 
uncertainty will also incentivize plaintiffs to bring more willfulness claims at 
the outset.54 Plaintiffs will have the power not only to obtain enhanced 
damages at trial, but also to exploit the threat of such damages to negotiate 
higher settlements. Yet another consequence of the lack of guidance is the 
potential for novel or fringe arguments supporting plaintiffs’ willfulness 
claims to gain traction.55 All of these possibilities will complicate the 
litigation process and increase costs in an already expensive litigation system. 
To the extent that the district courts and the Federal Circuit do have a 
semblance of a test to follow under Halo, it is very fact intensive. Many 
district courts have interpreted Halo as reemphasizing the importance of the 
Read factors in the analysis.56 Others have considered factors beyond Read: 
some courts examine egregiousness,57 others weigh the overall amount of 
 
the lack of a clear framework. While perhaps the discontinuity between the opinions is due to 
nothing more than imprecision of language, it underscores the observation that, even on a basic 
level, district courts do not have a uniform framework to follow. 
53 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 814 (2002) 
(discussing legal uncertainty generally and noting “the certainty provided by a settled body of law 
leads to a reduction in dispute resolution costs, both by narrowing the universe of potential 
controversies and by facilitating settlement when controversies do arise”). 
54 The extent of a law’s reach may be ambiguous in the aftermath of a substantive change. In 
such scenarios, the new law imposes learning costs on judges, lawyers, and the public. A wide swath 
of litigants will likely try to use the new law to their advantage until courts otherwise restrict its 
scope. See id. at 820-21 (emphasizing the learning costs associated with changes in the law, noting 
that judges and practitioners must “resolve questions of scope and limitation[] and unravel issues of 
meaning and effect” while the affected legal actors must figure out the new law’s “application to 
actual transactions and disputes”). 
55 Cf. id. (suggesting that there is a learning curve that accompanies a change of law as courts 
and actors attempt to figure out the metes and bounds of the new legal landscape); Louis Kaplow, 
Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 570 (1992) (explaining that one burden 
associated with standards rather than rules is that “adjudication [under the standard] will also require 
giving content to the standard”) (emphasis added). 
56 See Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., No. 6:13-cv-00366-RWS, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15345, at *33 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) (affirming the district court’s consideration of the nine 
nonexclusive Read factors); Adrea, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 303, 312 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017) (“If the court finds willfulness, it then considers the nine factors set forth in Read to determine 
whether the infringer’s behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant enhanced damages.”); Greatbatch 
Ltd. v. AVX Corp., No. 13-723-LPS, 2016 WL 7217625, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 2016) (recognizing Read 
factors as nonexclusive factors that can be applied); Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15-
224, 2016 WL 5674713, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (“While Halo changed the test for determining 
willful misconduct in enhanced damages, we continue to use the Read factors to aid our discretion.”); 
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coast Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 
2016) (“This Court finds the Read factors present useful guideposts . . . .”). 
57 See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(“While the Read factors remain helpful to this Court’s analysis, the touchstone for awarding 
enhanced damages after Halo is egregiousness.”). 
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compensation to the party infringed,58 and still others consider the extent of 
consultation with patent lawyers.59 
Whether relying on the Read factors or other factors, these approaches turn 
on case-specific facts. This fact-intensive analysis will decrease predictability 
and increase the burden of discovery.60 More specifically, the type of discovery 
encouraged by Halo is especially expensive. Discovery efforts will be heavily 
focused on evidence of egregiousness and mental states, factors that would not 
otherwise be relevant to the strict liability offense of patent infringement.61 
Facing the possibility of staggering discovery costs, defendants may settle at 
higher dollar amounts, even for potentially meritless claims.62 
A competing line of reasoning suggests that the wide discretion granted to 
district courts is a feature, not a bug, of the system. Proponents of Halo may argue 
that district courts, well grounded in the facts of each case, will establish patterns 
in their enhanced damages decisions. Although the boundaries of the Halo 
standard are relatively undefined now, this uncertainty will, the argument goes, 
be shed as the body of case law becomes more robust. That is, the fact-intensive 
nature of the doctrine will eventually create clarity and guide future litigants.63 
According to this argument, the case-by-case approach will lead to greater 
predictability of outcomes which, in turn, will lower litigation costs. 
 
58 See, e.g., Sociedad Espanola De Electromedicina Y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge X-Ray Co., 
No. 1:10-cv-00159-MR, 2016 WL 3661784, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. July 8, 2016) (noting that the Read 
factors are not dispositive and considering an additional factor of whether plaintiff has already been 
“amply compensated for the Defendants’ infringement”). 
59 See, e.g., LoggerHead Tools, LLC v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 12-cv-9033, 2016 WL 5112017, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2016) (using evidence regarding consultations with patent lawyers as an 
indication of good faith). 
60 The pre-Seagate enhanced damages jurisprudence was likewise criticized for its contribution to 
the expense of trials. It was noted that “[t]he willfulness inquiry is a highly subjective, fact-intensive 
analysis. Because of this, it is expensive and contributes to less predictable trial outcomes.” Jonathan 
M. Jackson, If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It: The Pitfalls of Major Reform of the Doctrine of Willful Patent 
Infringement in the Wake of Knorr-Bremse, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 72-73 (2006). Note 
that this same argument rings true in the post-Halo landscape, where the standard is once again 
subjective and case-specific. 
61 See Samuel Chase Means, Comment, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s 
Willful Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2016 (2013) 
(explaining that evidence addressing the willfulness inquiry is often complex, prejudicial, and 
otherwise superfluous against the backdrop of a strict liability offense). 
62 See Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Address at 
the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Conference: The State of Patent Litigation 8 (Sept. 27, 2011) 
(transcript available at https://perma.cc/4MUN-NA6P) (“Our courts are in danger already of 
becoming an intolerably expensive way to protect innovation or prove freedom to operate. These 
vast expenses can force accused infringers to acquiesce to nonmeritorious claims. This only serves 
as an unhealthy tax on innovation and open competition.”). 
63 This argument can be couched in the more general terms of the value of legal precedent and 
robust case law. See Van Alstine, supra note 53, at 824-25 (discussing the beneficial role of precedent 
and emphasizing that, in contexts of high uncertainty, case law “may be the only effective means of 
bringing coherence to the law”). 
2018] Halo Is Not the Saving Grace 1041 
This line of reasoning is unpersuasive on several grounds. First, it rests on 
the optimistic assumption that patterns will eventually emerge in the 
jurisprudence. However, the development of a clear and coherent doctrinal 
framework is not inevitable. With the plethora of approaches that district courts 
may choose to employ,64 it could take an overwhelming number of cases before 
a consensus forms, or one may never form at all. The heightened standard of 
review will also delay the generation of robust doctrine across jurisdictions. 
Second, this argument fails to account for the other shortcomings of Halo. 
Even if some of the ambiguity is resolved over time, the resulting test will 
nonetheless remain highly fact-intensive. Employing such a fact-intensive 
test will keep discovery costs high and litigation drawn-out. Finally, as is 
discussed below, Halo’s faults lie not only in the elevation of litigation costs 
during trial, but also in the lowered threshold for enhancing damages and the 
skewed incentives that will lead to forum shopping.65 Even in an ideal 
scenario where a clear pattern emerges, the presence of such a pattern will be 
inadequate to compensate for the potentially high damage awards and 
prevalent forum shopping resulting from Halo. 
B. The Frequency of Enhanced Damage Awards Will Increase 
In addition to the elevated costs incurred during litigation, the total costs 
may be inflated due to the more generous standard for enhancing damages.66 
The language in Halo explicitly reveals the Court’s intention to capture more 
bad actors than it was previously able to under the Seagate test.67 However, 
by lowering the threshold to capture these bad actors, Halo creates a standard 
that subjects a broad array of defendants to the threat of enhanced damages. 
The lower threshold for enhanced damages is a product of multiple facets 
of the Halo decision. The increased flexibility and authority afforded to 
district courts allows them to be more generous in enhancing damages. 
Depending on how a district court construes willfulness and egregiousness,68 
and on which factors it decides to place an emphasis,69 the realm of enhanced 
damages can be sculpted to fit a court’s inclinations. Other aspects of Halo 
also reduce the threshold for awarding enhanced damages. The decreased 
evidentiary standard for recklessness expands the range of conduct from 
 
64 See supra notes 53–59. 
65 See infra Sections III.B and III.C. 
66 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (rejecting the “unduly 
confin[ing]” Seagate test and thereby lowering the enhanced damages threshold as a consequence). 
67 See id. at 1932 (criticizing Seagate for “insulating some of the worst patent infringers from 
any liability for enhanced damages”). 
68 See supra text accompanying notes 50–51. 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 53–59. 
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which liability for enhanced damages can arise.70 Additionally, the heightened 
standard for review further insulates the district courts, allowing them to 
grant enhanced damages with less fear of being overturned. 
These features allow district courts to award enhanced damages more 
often, raising the final cost of litigation.71 The expanded authority to enhance 
damages will also affect settlement negotiations. Defendants, especially small 
start-ups, will face increased pressure to settle if there is a greater likelihood 
of enhanced damages.72 By lowering the threshold for enhanced damages, the 
final price tag after trial or after settlement negotiations will be elevated. 
C. Forum Shopping Will Become More Prevalent as  
Power Shifts to District Courts 
Not only does Halo encourage plaintiffs to bring suit, but it also 
incentivizes them to forum shop. With the heightened standard of review 
making it more difficult for the Federal Circuit to overturn district court 
verdicts, parties will devote more resources at the district court level.73 The 
greater emphasis placed on district court proceedings will motivate plaintiffs 
to find a forum that will be most favorable to them. 
Under the Court’s recent ruling in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group 
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), patent venue is only proper in the 
defendant corporation’s state of incorporation or “where the defendant has 
 
70 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (changing the standard to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard). Note that, although Halo lowers the evidentiary standard for recklessness from clear and 
convincing to preponderance of the evidence, it is not apparent under the sparse guidance that a 
finding of recklessness is necessary at all. See id. at 1932 (listing acceptable grounds for enhancing 
damages, including a finding that conduct is “characteristic of a pirate”). This interpretation would 
further lower the threshold for enhanced damages. 
71 At a minimum, district courts will have the opportunity to award enhanced damages in a 
greater variety of scenarios. Although drastic changes have not been observed in the approximately 
one year following Halo, changes may still be on the horizon. See, e.g., QUINN EMANUEL 
URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Enhanced Patent Damages in the Wake of Halo May Not Be So Easy to 
Come By, JDSUPRA (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/enhanced-patent-damages-
in-the-wake-of-96269/ [https://perma.cc/NYD2-XPLX] (“It appears that the initial concern that 
Halo would unleash a wave of decisions granting enhanced damages has not come to pass, although 
time will tell what the true impact of Halo will be.”). Shifting litigation incentives reveal themselves 
over time, and thus a greater body of case law is needed to determine how district courts will exercise 
their expanded authority. 
72 See Soroudi, supra note 31, at 326 (“Because many small companies have no other business 
alternatives and cannot afford the risks and costs of litigation, they are forced to settle for needless 
licenses. Patent trolls know this and exploit these small companies for a quick profit.”). 
73 Cf. Mateo J. de la Torre, Note, The Troll Toll: Why Liberalized Fee-Shifting in Patent Cases Will 
Do More Harm Than Good, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 836 (2016) (“Indeed, an increased likelihood 
of an adverse fee award coupled with a decreased ability to challenge such award on appeal will no 
doubt raise the stakes at the trial level, incentivizing patent litigants to fight even harder and expend 
more resources at trial.”). 
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committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 
business.”74 In response to TC Heartland, some courts have nonetheless 
interpreted patent venue broadly, giving plaintiffs substantial power in 
choosing where to bring suit.75 Plaintiffs seek out courts that award higher 
damages, have greater predictability, have a higher chance to go to trial, are 
speedier, or some combination of the preceding factors.76 
These tactics lead to negative consequences. Litigation costs rise as parties 
fight over venue.77 Unfairness concerns surface when plaintiffs exploit the 
unevenness across jurisdictions in order to seek out venues most favorable to 
them.78 Given that the Federal Circuit was created, in part, to standardize 
district-court jurisprudence and decrease the prevalence of forum shopping,79 the 
behavior incentivized by Halo is problematic as it undermines this policy goal. 
Admittedly, the selection of favorable districts by plaintiffs is already a 
commonplace behavior in patent law. For patent infringement suits, plaintiffs 
in recent history have tended to concentrate their cases in the Eastern District 
of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Eastern District of Virginia.80 The 
Patent Pilot Program further concentrates patent cases by funneling cases to 
willing, expert judges.81 Even though patent cases are already being channeled 
into certain jurisdictions, the compounding effects of Halo should not be 
ignored. The different considerations used by district courts in their enhanced 
damages analyses will exacerbate forum shopping abuses.82 In their calculus 
 
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999). Note that this decision was a change to the settled Federal 
Circuit interpretation allowing patent venue to be as broad as personal jurisdiction. See VE Holding 
Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
75 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 146372, at *31 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (finding it possible that an ANDA applicant “has 
committed acts of infringement” based on “acts the ANDA applicant non-speculatively intends to 
take if its ANDA receives final FDA approval”). But see In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (rejecting the Eastern District of Texas court’s generous approach to “regular and 
established place of business,” instead emphasizing that the physical place must be “a place of the 
defendant, not solely a place of the defendant’s employee”). With the possibility of a broad 
interpretation of § 1400(b), it is unclear just how effective TC Heartland will be at limiting patent 
venue, and by extension, forum shopping. 
76 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 635, 643 
(2015) (discussing how courts compete for litigants and listing the various characteristics of courts 
that draw patent litigants). 
77 See id. at 641, 645 (noting the frequency and intensity of venue disputes in patent litigation). 
78 See id. at 637 (mentioning the problems brought about by forum shopping, “ranging from 
reduced trust in the judicial process to uneven playing fields for litigants”). 
79 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (discussing the motivations for creating the Federal Circuit, including the desire to 
“produce horizontal equity, and reduce opportunistic litigation strategies such as forum shopping”). 
80 See Anderson, supra note 76, at 651-58 (summarizing patent activity in these three districts 
and addressing the benefits that each district offers plaintiffs). 
81 See id. at 637. 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 53–59. 
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regarding where to file, patent trolls will prioritize jurisdictions in which the 
district court’s approach to enhanced damages is the most generous, all else 
being equal. Although forum shopping is already rampant in patent law, there 
is no justification to further cement these nonoptimal litigation incentives. 
The full implication of Halo on forum shopping will be elucidated by 
courts’ continuing interpretation of TC Heartland. Given early responses to 
TC Heartland,83 plaintiffs, including patent trolls, continue to have significant 
power in selecting the forum.84 By allowing diversity among district courts, 
Halo bolsters the threat of forum shopping, making any upcoming changes by 
the Court or by Congress especially pertinent. 
D. The Confluence of Factors Will Frustrate the Goal of  
an Efficient Litigation Regime 
Halo’s ambiguous, fact-intensive test, coupled with depressed evidentiary 
burdens and heightened standards of review, produces undesirable effects. A 
plaintiff ’s higher potential recovery skews the bargaining power in favor of 
large companies that can afford extensive litigation. The greater prominence 
afforded to district courts will fuel forum shopping. This will prolong 
litigation and favor large companies that are able to expend greater resources 
on fighting for a favorable forum. These factors work together to create a 
doctrine that is ripe for abuse by patent trolls. Wealthy, patent-holding 
plaintiffs will be incentivized to bring nuisance suits, spoiling the efficiency 
of the patent system. More generally, the high costs and protracted arguments 
will prevent the judicial system from reviewing a high volume of patents. 
Not only will Halo add cost to an already expensive litigation system, but 
it will also discourage parties from reaching trial. The threat of high litigation 
costs and the potential for enhanced damages may sway small defendants to 
settle even meritless cases. Parties will favor settlement, if the alternative is 
an incredibly expensive trial.85 With fewer cases being resolved at trial and 
expounded upon in court opinions, it will take longer for patterns to emerge 
in the jurisprudence. Courts will not have the opportunity to affirm the 
validity of “good” patents or weed out “bad” patents. 
Halo also has upstream implications. Innovators in crowded fields or in 
industries dominated by patent trolls may be deterred from pursuing 
research. They may find that the risk of an infringement suit and the threat 
 
83 See supra note 75. 
84 Note that a decrease of filings in the Eastern District of Texas in response to TC Heartland 
does not by itself prove that plaintiff ’s choice of venue has been sufficiently constrained. Many other 
districts remain available to plaintiffs, thus leaving the door open for forum shopping abuses. 
85 See Soroudi, supra note 31, at 325 (noting that patent trolls use the threat of high litigation 
costs to influence others to yield to licensing settlements). 
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of treble damages under Halo’s uncertain, plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence will 
outweigh potential profits. In particular, small start-up companies will be 
disproportionately harmed.86 These emerging companies will face substantial 
barriers to entry in the form of nuisance suits. The standard set forth by Halo 
is thus impeding a fundamental aim of the patent system: “to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts.”87 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The patent system is intended to balance the competing interests of 
patent holders, innovators, and the public.88 To date, no enhanced damages 
standard has been perfectly calibrated to balance these interests. The Seagate 
standard was under-inclusive, overly-formalistic, and not responsive to the 
particulars of each case.89 Nor does the Halo test strike the right balance. The 
fact-intensive and open-ended standard tips the balance too far in the other 
direction, ultimately empowering large companies and patent trolls. The 
solution presented in this paper contemplates a middle ground between the 
Seagate and Halo doctrines, capturing undesirable behavior while providing a 
workable and cost-effective framework for courts to follow. In addition to 
advancing a revised enhanced damages standard, the proposal incorporates 
changes to the pleading requirements and venue rules. Each of these 
procedural aspects—enhanced damages, pleading standards, and venue—can 
be tailored such that the resulting litigation will be less burdensome and thus 
a better tool for the resolution of patents. 
A. Limit District Court Discretion in the Enhanced Damages Analysis 
The discretion of the district courts should be appropriately cabined. This 
proposal limits the factors that can be considered during the subjective 
 
86 See id. (commenting that small companies are especially targeted by patent trolls). But see 
de la Torre, supra note 73, at 838-39 (pointing out that since small firms might also be plaintiffs, 
efforts to shift the balance more in defendants’ favor could harm small, patent-holding firms). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
88 See 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 6435 at *15 (citing Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)): 
[T]his Court consistently has considered the . . . delicate balance among the 
competing public interests of (1) the would-be inventor lured by the promise of patent 
exclusivity; (2) the subsequent artisan seeking to build on previous advances either by 
licensing patent technology at a fair price or inventing around the patent; and (3) the 
public desiring unencumbered use of the public domain. 
89 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19:13-16, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (“[H]aving taken the bar too 
low in Underwater Devises [the Court] overcompensated in Seagate. We think the bar ought to be 
high. We just don’t think it ought to be arbitrarily high as it is now.”). 
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inquiry into the question of willfulness. The analysis should be restricted to 
a subset of the Read factors. Instead of granting district courts the discretion 
to consider all circumstances, courts should focus on (1) whether there was 
deliberate copying, (2) whether there were any remedial actions taken by the 
defendant, (3) whether there were attempts to conceal the defendant’s 
misconduct, and (4) the size and financial condition of the defendant.90 
These particular Read factors are chosen for their salience in the analysis 
and their objectivity. The presence of deliberate copying is at the core of willful 
infringement, and thus should be the focus of a court’s inquiry.91 The other 
three factors involve ascertainable facts: remedial actions, concealment of 
misconduct, and financial characteristics. Unlike other Read factors, which 
inquire into the subjective motivation of the defendant or presence of a good 
faith belief, these factors allow for a more straightforward analysis, expediting 
litigation. The knowledge factor from Read is not included here because, as the 
Halo concurrence emphasizes, knowledge alone is not enough for awarding 
enhanced damages.92 Accordingly, inquiring into whether the defendant had 
knowledge of the patent is an inefficient allocation of judicial resources. 
By limiting the analysis to four factors, courts’ competing interpretations of 
“willfulness” and “egregiousness” become less problematic. Because courts would 
have to ground their enhanced damages decisions in the above factors, the 
outcome of a case would not depend on the particular construction of “willfulness” 
and “egregiousness.” The four enumerated factors, especially the deliberate 
copying factor, serve as an adequate proxy for willfulness and egregiousness. 
With this constrained discretion, district courts will retain some flexibility 
to consider the circumstances of each case, but parties will know in advance 
which facts will be most salient. This knowledge will keep discovery costs in 
check and will narrow the scope of arguments raised in litigation. It will also 
protect the threshold for enhanced damages from future erosion,93 thereby 
decreasing the frequency of such awards. To the extent that the emergence of 
a pattern from Halo was dismissed earlier with skepticism,94 this proposal 
offers a greater chance that a pattern will emerge because there would be 
fewer factors for judges to consider. 
 
90 Cf. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (providing the full set of factors). 
91 See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) (discussing the 
companion case, Stryker, and taking issue that the defendant “had all-but instructed its design team 
to copy [Plaintiff]’s products”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 See id. at 1936 (emphasizing that mere knowledge does not rise to the level of willful 
infringement and interpreting the majority’s opinion as instead placing a greater emphasis on the 
egregiousness of the conduct). 
93 See supra discussion in Section III.A (discussing how Halo’s open-ended standard may open 
the floodgates for arguments during litigation). 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
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The increased certainty and decreased discovery costs would provide 
numerous additional benefits. The negotiating power of patent trolls would 
be reduced and nuisance suits would become less effective.95 Lower litigation 
costs would increase parties’ willingness to proceed to trial, allowing courts 
to clear out more invalid patents from the current landscape. Additionally, 
district court decisions would become more standardized, which may decrease 
incentives for forum shopping.96 
B. Raise the Pleading Standards for Willful Infringement 
The constrained discretion standard will not completely eliminate the 
expensive nature of patent litigation. The analysis will still be rooted in the facts 
of each case, requiring costly discovery. To account for this, the pleading 
standard for willful infringement should be heightened. A heightened pleading 
standard would police the claims at an earlier and less costly stage of litigation.97 
Instead of the current plausibility standard,98 the threshold should be raised 
to match the fraud pleading standard. The burden would be on the plaintiff to 
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting” the willful 
infringement.99 In light of the four factors chosen by this proposal, the plaintiff 
would have to state with particularity circumstances that would implicate 
deliberate copying, lack of remedial action by the defendant, concealed 
misconduct, or a strong financial condition of the defendant. Under the current 
system, a heightened pleading standard would be impractical because it is 
unclear what factors a district court will deem important to its analysis. Here, 
however, the exclusive factors provide guidance as to what types of allegations 
would support a finding of willful infringement. Thus, the change to the 
pleading standard becomes a workable addition to this proposal. Pleadings that 
do not meet this standard would be subject to dismissal by the Court.100 
The justifications for the heightened pleading requirements for fraud are 
compatible with the enhanced damages context. The high pleading standard 
 
95 Cf. Soroudi, supra note 31, at 326 (noting that expensive and uncertain litigation benefits patent trolls). 
96 Although uniformity tends to limit a party’s incentive to forum shop, this constrained 
discretion model may only have a marginal impact. Given that other variables affect a plaintiff ’s 
decision regarding venue, this factor alone will not be dispositive. See supra text accompanying notes 
73-79 (discussing other considerations at play with respect to forum shopping). 
97 Previous proposals have suggested requiring plaintiffs to more specifically point out 
allegedly infringing products and particular patent claims implicated at the pleading stage. Similar 
to the proposal advanced in this Comment, such heightened pleading standards “could beneficially 
shift the burden back to the plaintiff to do more diligence before filing a suit.” See Jared A. Smith 
& Nicholas R. Transier, Trolling for an NPE Solution, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 215, 235-36 
(2015) (discussing the heightened requirements contemplated by the Innovation Act). 
98 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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for fraud is intended to protect “defendants’ reputations . . . from lightly 
made allegations of morally reprehensible acts.”101 Likewise, reputational 
harm can occur as patent holders allege that companies engaged in egregious 
or malicious behavior.102 More notably, the pleading standard for fraud is also 
justified on the grounds that the heightened requirements will protect 
potential defendants against “baseless suits filed for nuisance or settlement 
value.”103 Again, this rationale can be extended to the willful infringement 
context. Limiting the number of nuisance suits has been repeatedly 
articulated as an important policy goal in the patent law sphere.104 
Although a heightened pleading standard has not yet been adopted, some 
district courts have already moved toward elevated requirements for willful 
infringement claims. For example, in Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Ubisoft 
Entertainment SA, the Delawa\re district court held that a claim for willful 
infringement was insufficient because the plaintiff did not adequately allege 
that the defendant was put on notice. The court further held that the plaintiff 
did not “sufficiently articulate how [defendant]’s actions . . . amount to an 
‘egregious’ case of infringement of the patent.”105 By mandating a heightened 
pleading standard across all jurisdictions, not only will this protect 
reputations and limit nuisance suits, but it will also bring with it the benefits 
that flow from a more uniform litigation system. 
The heightened pleading requirement will result in more claims being 
dismissed at the pleading stage. Considering the staggering expense of 
 
101 Morwenna Borden, Note, Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter and the Proper 
Application of Rule 9(b) to Duty-Based Misrepresentations, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-17 (2014). 
102 The threat of reputational damage is arguably less severe in the patent infringement context 
given the commonplace nature of willful infringement claims. See Means, supra note 61, at 2019 
(discussing the frequency of willful infringement allegations). 
103 Borden, supra note 101, at 1116. 
104 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa) (emphasizing the 
undesirability of “frivolous lawsuits that amount to litigation extortion”). 
105 No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153207, at *40 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2016); see also 
CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. Big Fish Games, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115594, at *43-44 (D. Nev. 
Aug. 29, 2016) (finding a claim for willful infringement insufficient because it “fail[s] to allege any 
facts suggesting that Defendant’s conduct is ‘egregious . . . beyond typical infringement’” and 
instead only makes “conclusory allegations”); Varian Med. Sys. v. Elekta AB, No. 15-871-LPS, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91226, at *26-27 (D. Del. July 12, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim on the basis 
that it “does little more than provide a formulaic recitation of the pre-Halo elements of a willful 
infringement claim” and fails to “articulate how the . . . making, using or offering for sale . . . actually 
amounted to an egregious case”). Not all jurisdictions have required such bolstered allegations, 
though. See, e.g., Scripps Research Inst. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 16-cv-661 JLS (BGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 161279, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (requiring merely a plausible allegation of knowledge 
of the patent); Malibu Boats, LLC v. MasterCraft Boat Co., LLC, No.: 3:16-CV-82-TAV-HBG, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183202, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 2016) (same); Blitzsafe, Tex. LLC v. 
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1274-JRG-RSP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124144, at *23-24 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016) (same). 
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discovery for the willfulness inquiry,106 avoiding this avenue completely in 
certain cases will make litigation costs more manageable. Knowing in advance 
that enhanced damages are foreclosed and, accordingly, that less resources 
will have to be expended during discovery, parties may be more willing to 
proceed to trial. The heightened standard may also signal to parties that 
willful infringement should not be awarded in run-of-the-mill infringement 
cases.107 The elevated standard could alter the current norm of automatically 
including willful infringement claims.108 Over time, this behavioral shift 
would decrease the average damages awarded in patent litigation. 
C. Limit Choice of Venue 
The third feature of this proposal consists of a change in venue rules that 
will temper forum shopping. If the heightened standard of review as 
established in Halo is maintained, the importance of the role of district courts 
will remain elevated.109 This proposal’s attempt to standardize jurisdictions 
by constraining the discretion of district courts will only do so much to curb 
the forum shopping abuses. Thus, this proposal can be further bolstered by a 
reform of the venue statute. As the holding in TC Heartland is susceptible to 
a very generous interpretation, a statutory change is a more promising avenue 
for tightening venue selection.110 
While the particulars of venue reform are beyond the scope of this paper, 
any general move toward restricting the plaintiff ’s choice of venue would 
complement the aims of this proposal.111 By reducing the opportunities to 
litigate over forum, litigation costs will accordingly decrease. This will benefit 
smaller companies that are not able to afford costly fights over forum. 
Decreased litigation costs will lead to more cases going to trial and the 
resolution of more disputes over patent validity. Moreover, limiting forums 
available to plaintiffs can prevent plaintiffs from choosing excessively 
“plaintiff-friendly” venues.112 For example, by removing venues with high 
 
106 See Means, supra note 61, at 2014 (observing that the United States “is the most expensive 
jurisdiction in the world for patent litigation,” due to the direct and indirect expenses of patent litigation). 
107 This goal was also espoused by Halo. See 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (stating that damages 
should not be enhanced for “garden-variety cases”). 
108 Cf. Means, supra note 61, at 2019 (finding that it is common practice to allege willful 
infringement and likening these claims to “‘boilerplate’ for any infringement action”). 
109 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
110 See supra Section III.C. 
111 For a more comprehensive discussion of patent venue reform, see generally Ana Santos Rutschman, 
Patent Venue Exceptionalism after TC Heartland v. Kraft, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 29 (2016-2017). 
112 See generally Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (advancing reasons why 
the Eastern District of Texas is popular among plaintiffs, particularly patent trolls, and advocating 
for venue reform). If venue is limited to, for example, the state of incorporation, this would prevent 
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discovery costs from the equation, average litigation costs will be reduced, 
promoting more cases to proceed to trial instead of settling. Taking power away 
from plaintiffs in this way may also decrease the occurrence of nuisance suits. 
Although limiting nuisance suits leads to fewer lawsuits, courts would 
consequently be able to allocate resources to more meritorious patent disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
With an accumulation of invalid patents and a post-issuance administrative 
system that offers an incomplete—and possibly unconstitutional—solution,113 
litigation becomes the backstop for resolving issues in the patent system. As 
society continues to move further away from the simple steam-engine world, 
as Justice Breyer observes,114 a strong last line of defense is even more 
important for a healthy patent system. The amassing of invalid patents and 
the corresponding abuse by patent trolls has been at the forefront of policy 
and scholarly discussions, but there has yet to be an effective solution. 
Rather than providing a viable answer, Halo will lead the patent system 
in the wrong direction by increasing costs and uncertainty and decreasing 
efficiency and accessibility. By addressing three procedural aspects—
enhanced damages, pleading requirements, and venue rules—this Comment’s 
proposal aims to improve upon a flawed litigation regime. Efforts to reduce 
litigation costs will result in more cases proceeding to trial. Putting more 
patents in front of judges will allow a greater quantity of invalid patents to 
be weeded out. To escape the current trajectory—a future that is flooded with 
patents of questionable validity and that lacks an adequately equipped 
litigation structure—the Court should rein in the discretion authorized by 
Halo and simultaneously tighten the pleading and venue rules. 
 
many companies from filing suit in the Eastern District of Texas. See id. at Part II (noting the small 
population and lack of businesses present in Marshall, Texas). 
113 See supra notes 10–11. 
114 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
